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Abstract
This paper builds and tests a model of marriage as an incomplete contract that
arises from asymmetric virginity premiums and examines whether this can lead to
social ine ciencies. Contrary to the e cient households hypothesis, women cannot
prevent being appropriated by men once they enter marriage if they command lower
marriage market opportunities upon divorce. Because men cannot or do not commit to
compensating women for their lower ex post marriage market opportunities, marriage
is an incomplete contract. Men may seek to lower women’s ex ante “market wages”
in order to induce entry into joint production. Ine cient or abusive marriages are
less likely to separate. Equalizing virginity premiums may reduce domestic and non-
domestic violence.
Female circumcision and prices women pay doctors to appear virgin before marriage
in many countries suggest asymmetric virginity premiums continue to exist. Evidence
from China and the US suggest asymmetric virginity premiums persist over economic
development. Asymmetric virginity premiums are strongly positively correlated with
female but not male virginity premiums. I use variation in religious upbringing to
help estimate the e↵ect of virginity premiums on gender violence in the US. The OLS
relationship between virginity premiums and female reports of forced sex may be biased
downwards if shame is associated with abuse and this shame is greater for women with
higher virginity premiums. But the OLS relationship for males might not be biased
downwards. Asymmetric virginity premiums are positively correlated with men forcing
sex on women and paying women for sex. The model complements a growing empirical
literature on ine cient households and human rights abuses, visible manifestations of
female appropriability across time and space.
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Gender violence is a human rights issue and a public health problem (IPPF).1 40% of
Chinese women experience unwanted sex or sex acts (Kew 2004). 25% of young South
African women’s first sexual experience was forced (Epstein 2004). In the US, roughly
one in five girls experience physical or sexual dating violence (Silverman 2001). Domestic
violence is the leading cause of injury to women in the US and claims an estimated 4 million
victims each year. Between one-third to one-half of all women are assaulted by a spouse or
partner at some point during their lifetime. One-third of all female homicide victims are
killed by a husband or boyfriend. The American Medical Association estimates the cost of
domestic violence to be between $5-10 billion per year (Rhode 1999).
Asymmetric virginity premiums are a metaphor for any inequality between men and
women’s ex ante and ex post marriage market opportunities. This includes stigma for di-
vorced women but not for divorced men (Onishi 2003, Holden and Smock 1991, Bernheim
et. al 2004, Joshi 2004), di↵erential valuation placed on the number of partners (Con-
nolly 2003), the conceptualization of virginity as a female virtue (Duby and Perrot, eds.
1994, Epstein 1973), penalty for lost labor market time (Hotchkiss and Pitts 2003, Critten-
den 2001), child burden and marriage bars, and even di↵erential STD transmission rates
(Holmes 1999). The asymmetry appears to exist across time and space. A rich historical
literature documents its existence (Duby and Perrot, eds. 1994) and imprint on legal and
religious codes (Epstein 1973). The asymmetry still exists today: approximately 2 million
girls a year encounter female genital mutilation (Nussbaum 1996), under the belief it guar-
antees a girl’s virginity. In many countries, women seek surgery to restore virginity ñand in
a report in the British medical journal, The Lancet, the availability of the surgery reduced
by 80% the murders committed when a bride was found not to be a virgin (Kandela 1996).
Is there a connection between asymmetric virginity premiums and gender violence? To
theoretically explore the connection, I build a model of marriage as an incomplete contract
where men and women di↵er in ex ante and ex post marriage market opportunities. The
di↵erence-in-di↵erences is termed the asymmetric virginity premium. The model predicts
that wives or their families should be compensated ex ante for loss of virginity, such as
courtship rituals, lower dowries, or higher bride prices. It also predicts that as long as
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Whether it takes the form of psychological, physical, or sexual abuse, gender violence has been linked to
increased risk of gynecological disorders, unsafe abortion, pregnancy complications, miscarriage, low birth
weight, pelvic inflammatory disease, and H.I.V. (IPPF).
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marriage has a positive surplus, men have the incentive to lower women’s ex ante market
wages to encourage entry into joint production (non-domestic assault). Marriages revealing
negative surpluses after marriage would separate under complete contracts but do not
under asymmetry (domestic assault). Equalizing virginity premiums therefore may reduce
non-domestic and domestic violence.
To empirically examine whether asymmetric virginity premiums lead to gender violence,
I analyze two data sets, the Chinese Health and Family Life Survey (CHFLS) and National
Health and Social Life Survey (NHSLS), nationally representative surveys of China and
the US, consisting of 3,821 and 3,432 adults respectively, where I infer virginity premiums
from self-reported morality of premarital sex. I first document that asymmetric virginity
premiums persist in China and the US. To motivate computing individualized asymmetric
virginity premiums, I find that in China but not the US, the asymmetry disappears with
education, and in the US, the asymmetry is highest in the US South.
I then estimate an individualized asymmetric virginity premium by calculating the vir-
ginity premium if an individual’s gender were switched, in essence, matching an individual
to the closest person of the opposite gender based on observed characteristics, such as
education and location.
The OLS relationship between asymmetric virginity premiums and female reports of
forced sex may be biased downwards if shame is associated with abuse and this shame is
greater for women with higher virginity premiums (French 2003). “Blaming the victim”
(Rubinger, et. al) may be prevalent in male-centric societies that lower the marginal cost
to males of manipulating female market wages. To address this non-classical measurement
error, I first observe that asymmetric virginity premiums are strongly positively correlated
with female premiums but not male premiums, which theory predicts if male premiums go
to zero and female premiums do not. This suggests that examining the impact of female
virginity premiums alone may be similar to examining the impact of asymmetric virginity
premiums, necessary because any instrumental variables strategy involving demographic
variables would be mechanically related to the asymmetry, which is computed using these
demographics. I then use variation in conservatism of religious upbringing to help identify
the e↵ect of female virginity premiums on gender violence.
In the US, female virginity premiums are strongly linked with religious conservatism.
Women raised in religiously conservative households have higher virginity premiums and
su↵er more forced sex, but are no more likely to refrain from thinking about sex or think
of teenage sex as a moral issue, indicating that premiums are not capturing prudishness or
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general moral views towards sex. I also conduct a series of control experiments, alterna-
tively examining women raised in less educated or immigrant households, to test whether
traditionalism may be an omitted confound that explains the link between virginity pre-
miums and gender violence.
The OLS relationship between asymmetric virginity premiums and male reports of
forced sex might not be biased downwards. In fact, asymmetric virginity premiums are
positively correlated with men forcing sex on women and paying women for sex.
Economists have traditionally built models of households as being e cient (Becker 1991,
Chiappori and Weiss 2003), but a growing empirical literature suggests they are not (Duflo
and Udry 2003, Qian 2004). This paper presents a theory showing why households might
not be e cient. It is also related to a growing literature on gender violence (Stevenson
and Wolfers 2003, Bowlus and Seitz 2002, Bloch and Rao 2002, Pezzini 2003, Aizer and Bo
2004), marriage and contract theory (Chiappori and Weiss 2003, Rasul 2004), and impact
of beliefs (Chen 2004b).
Section 2 presents qualitative evidence of asymmetric virginity premiums from historical
and contemporary records. Section 3 constructs a model showing how, contrary to the
e cient households hypothesis, women cannot prevent being appropriated by men once
they enter marriage if they command lower marriage market opportunities if divorced.
Section 4 presents quantitative evidence of asymmetric virginity premiums in China and
the US. Section 5 presents two-stage least squares estimates of the impact of virginity
premiums on forced sex using variation in virginity premiums that stems from religious
upbringing in the US. Section 6 concludes.
2 Qualitative Evidence of Asymmetric Virginity Premiums
In antiquity, virginity appears to have been typically an exclusively female virtue. It was
inculcated as the supreme value for all women. Christianity justified that value based on
theology: virgins could expect greater rewards in heaven than married women. Not only
the fate of the child’s soul but the honor of the family depended on it. Stained linen from
the marriage bed was often the sole admissible proof of a bride’s virginity. Slave girls whose
virginity could be proven sold for higher prices. On the other hand, puberty and sexual
initiation were synonymous for boys. (Duby and Perrot, eds. 1994)
Legal and religious codes also give evidence of asymmetric virginity premiums. Di-
vorced women, widows, and unwed mothers were ineligible for part of the bride price
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that was conceived as “the price of virginity”. Rabbinic law prescribed a fine equal to a
minimum mohar (bride price of 50 shekels) of virgins for rape (Deuteronomy 22:29) and
seduction (Exodus 22:15-16), which represented theft of virginity (Epstein 1973). Rape
and consensual nonmarital sex are still equated in parts of Turkey today (Filkins 2003).
Asymmetric virginity premiums continue to exist around the world, however. Approx-
imately two million girls a year encounter female genital mutilation (Nussbaum 1996),
because circumcision is believed to guarantee a girl’s virginity, thus make them marriage-
able. In Arabic, uncircumcised girls are considered filthy and unclean. Girls are taught
that their most important mission in life is to remain virgins until they marry. If they
don’t, there are cases where fathers kill their daughters or send them to asylums (such as
the Magdalene Asylums in Ireland). “In Yemen recently, a man shot his daughter dead
on her wedding night after her husband said she was not a virgin. ... A father learned his
daughter had eloped with a man. Gathering sons, brothers, uncles and cousins, he headed
north in a convoy of about 20 cars. The men stormed the bride’s new home and threw her
into one of the cars. When the convoy reached the edge of her village, her father hurled
her to the asphalt and had every car drive over her.” (Seattle Times 1998)
In many countries, women seek surgery to restore virginity. The surgery typically
involves suturing the remnants of the ruptured hymen together with a gelatin capsule
containing a bloodlike substance (Choi 1998). These surgeries are found in China, Korea,
Indonesia, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Morocco, and even the Netherlands, New York City, and
Los Angeles (Pan 2003). This creolization of modern medical technology and traditional
social mores is not limited to Islamic and Asian countries: “virginity soap” is sold all over
eastern and southern Africa (Oriang 2003). Police report the availability of the surgery in
Egypt reduced by 80% the murders committed when a bride was found not to be a virgin
on the wedding night (Kandela 1996). Prices for the surgery vary from $340 in China,
$100-600 in Egypt, and an average of $570 in Turkey (Choi 1998).
Even the US, where several states have abstinence-only sex education, use language
that di↵erentially faults women: “Go ahead and use a condom. You’ll still be known as
a slut” (Connolly 2003). In a sample of a faith-based community, 14% believe if women
submit to their husbands as God desires there would be less spouse abuse, 9% believe if a
woman submits to her husband as God desires, God will give her the strength to endure
the abuse, and 10% believe as a Christian, they should be willing to accept a marriage in
which some violence is present, rather than separate or divorce (Drumm, et.al 2004).
A recent interview in the Chicago Tribune Magazine (Schle↵er 2004) illustrates di↵erent
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aspects of the model and empirical work. It suggests the phenomena might be attenuated
in the US but if we do find an e↵ect here, the asymmetry and its e↵ects could be much
worse in developing countries.
“For Carolina, 35, a first-generation Puerto Rican interviewed for this story, coming of
sexual age involved a formal courtship that placed a premium on keeping her and her sisters
in check (emphasis added). In her household, boys would come to the house and “declare”
themselves; that is, they would tell the parents that they wanted to date their daughters.
Ground rules would be set: Boys were allowed to visit on Tuesdays and Saturdays.
“My sisters never dated,” says Carolina, the youngest in a family of 12. “The first guy
who declared himself is the guy they married. The American way, where you date di↵erent
people and see who you like, wasn’t an option.”
Carolina and her sisters would meet boys at socially sanctioned and closely monitored
places, such as church and family gatherings, not at high school.
The rules did not apply for the males in the family. Carolina says her father was
something of a womanizer in Puerto Rico, and her brothers, once they moved to the U.S.,
were allowed to date whomever they wanted, all the while keeping a close eye on their
sisters.
One reason for the restrictions is the fear of pregnancy among traditionally devout
Catholic Puerto Rican families, for whom birth control and abortion are not up for discus-
sion.
Even when it came time to go o↵ to college, Carolina’s mother was against it. “She said:
‘A girl doesn’t study, a girl gets married. You’re going there with all those ‘Americanos.’
In my mothers book, they were the unknowns,” says Carolina. “ ‘All you want to do is go
have sex with boys,’ she’d tell me.”
But the sexual guilt hasn’t necessarily gone away. Since she’s not married, it’s assumed
among certain family members in her community that she still has her virginity. “That’s
how prized it [is] to this very day,” she says.”
The asymmetric virginity premium is a metaphor for any inequality between men and
women’s ex ante and ex post marriage opportunities. In Bangladesh, widows have lower
re-marriage rates than widowers (Joshi 2004). In South Korea, divorced women are stig-
matized as promiscuous or heavy drinkers (Onishi 2003). Today’s lost labor market time
and child burden may substitute for yesterday’s price of virginity. Divorced men are better
o↵ than divorced women (Holden and Smock 1991, Bernheim et.al 2004). A sizeable wage
penalty exists for intermittency (Hotchkiss and Pitts 2003) and women are doubly penal-
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ized for their lost labor market time (Crittenden 2001) or disallowed from working after
entering marriage (historical Japan, US, and Indonesia). Depending on the social mores,
marriage itself can be a metaphor for dating and social stigma appears to rise for women
with many sexual partners but not for men. Even in the US, asymmetric virginity premi-
ums seem to persist: a Manhattan defendant who raped a retarded woman got a reduced
sentence because she had been raped before and the court assumed that the impact of the
assault was therefore “considerably less” severe (Rhode 1999).
3 Model
The starting point for the analysis is a very simple model. Let wma denote male ex ante
wages, wfa denote female ex ante wages, wmp denote male ex post wages, and wfp denote
female ex post wages, where wfa   wfp > wma   wmp, which indicates a greater female
virginity premium, wfa   wfp, than male virginity premium, wma   wmp.
To illustrate the basic intuition, consider the extreme case where women receive nothing
ex post and men have exactly the same ex ante and ex post opportunities: let wfp = 0,
wma = wmp ⌘ wm, and wfa ⌘ wf . Suppose J is the joint surplus in marriage and
is divided under Nash bargaining. Under standard bargaining theory, agents receive their
outside opportunity plus a share of joint production. Females receive S/2 and males receive
S/2 + wm, where S + wm = J .
If the joint surplus is not su ciently large2, females su↵er a drop from wf to [J wm]/2
but males gain from wm to wm + [J   wm]/2. Because of the asymmetry, men have the
incentive to compensate women or their families ex ante for virginity: men are willing to
transfer up to [J   wm]/2, their private gain from joint production, to encourage women
to enter joint production. Men also have the incentive to lower women’s ex ante market
wages until women are indi↵erent between autarky and joint production.
Now suppose J is uncertain and the surplus can be revealed to be negative after mar-
riage. Under complete contracts, where there are no virginity premiums and everyone has
the same ex ante and ex post market wages, if the realized marriage surplus is negative,
marriages will e ciently separate. But they will not under asymmetry.
To show these propositions rigorously, consider the more general formulation where
wfa   wfp > wma   wmp, where we only assume a greater female premium than male
2
and not too small, wm < J < 2wf + wm
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premium. Females receive S/2+wfp and males receive S/2+wmp, where S+wmp+wfp = J .
Females su↵er a drop from wfa to [J   wmp + wfp]/2 if joint production is too small
(J < 2wfa + wmp   wfp ⌘ Jmax). Males gain from wma to [J + wmp   wfp]/2 if joint
production exceeds a threshold (J > 2wma   wmp + wfp ⌘ Jmin). There exists a range of
J such that men gain more from joint production than do women, and the range is twice
the di↵erential virginity premium: Jmax   Jmin = 2[(wfa   wfp)  (wma   wmp)].
Algebraically, the change in female welfare is [J   wmp + wfp]/2   wfa; the change in
male welfare is [J+wmp wfp]/2 wma. Males gain more when [J+wmp wfp]/2 wma 
[J  wmp +wfp]/2+wfa = [wmp  wfp]/2 wma   [ wmp +wfp]/2+wfa = (wfa  wfp) 
(wma  wmp), which is the asymmetric virginity premium. The change in female welfare is
negative when [J wmp+wfp]/2 wfa < 0, or equivalently, J < 2wfa+wmp wfp ⌘ Jmax.
The change in male welfare is positive when [J +wmp wfp]/2 wma > 0, or equivalently,
J > 2wma   wmp + wfp ⌘ Jmin.
This leads to the first proposition:
Proposition 1 : Wives or their families should be compensated ex ante for loss of virgin-
ity, such as courtship rituals, lower dowries, or higher bride prices. The greater likelihood
the woman is a virgin, the greater the bride price or smaller the dowry. Positive shocks to
virginity premiums increase bride prices and decrease dowries.
Suppose males can compensate females ex ante with any transfer T > 0. Males are
willing to transfer up to [J+wmp wfp]/2 wma, their private gain from joint production.
The transfer must be large enough to compensate females for their prospective loss: T +
[J  wmp+wfp]/2 wfa > 0. Males will set T = wfa  [J  wmp+wfp]/2 to make females
indi↵erent between joint production and autarky, if they have the resources. Males have
the resources when their willingness to transfer [J + wmp   wfp]/2   wma, exceeds the
woman’s loss wfa   [J   wmp + wfp]/2, or equivalently, J > wma + wfa ⌘ Jmid. There
exists a range of J such that ex ante transfers are enough to compensate for the woman’s
loss of virginity: Jmax > Jmid > Jmin; Jmid is the average of Jmin and Jmax . As the
likelihood of virginity, wfa, rises or the premium, wfa  wfp, rises, T tends to rise as well.
Time between menarche and age of marriage is positively associated with the dowry paid
by the woman’s family to the man’s family (Bangladesh, Field 2004), one interpretation of
which is that the lower the likelihood the woman is virgin, the greater the dowry. In some
societies (rabbinic law), bride prices literally translated into, the price of virginity, paid at
the time of a woman’s first marriage but not for subsequent ones. That bride prices are
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paid to a woman’s family prevents immediate appropriation by the man in marriage. In
Roman law, dowries were restituted to women if they had not lost their virginity when
the marriage was dissolved. Other forms of transfers include gifts of cash or consumer
goods from boyfriends (southern Africa) and, more generally, marriage promises and uni-
directional presents (betrothal present) as courtship ritual (Epstein 1973).
There exists a range of surpluses Jmid > J > Jmin, where ex ante transfers are not
enough to compensate for the woman’s loss. Then, the second observation is:
Proposition 2 : Men have the incentive to lower women’s ex ante market wages, wfa,
in order to induce entry into joint production. Male-centric societies tend to lower the
marginal cost of ex ante manipulation.
If males reduce female ex ante wages to below what they receive in marriage, females will
prefer joint production. In the absence of transfers, males will reduce female ex ante wages,
wfa, until females are indi↵erent: wfa = [J wmp+wfp]/2 ⌘ windifff . With transfers, males
will set ex ante transfers, T , and ex ante manipulation, wfa, until women are indi↵erent
between autarky and joint production, T + [J  wmp +wfp]/2 wfa = 0. In rabbinic law,
unwed mothers who have lost their virginity cannot claim part of the brideprice (Epstein
1973). Shotgun marriages is one manifestation of ex ante manipulation. As recently as the
mid-20th century, women were required to marry once they become pregnant (Bernstein
2004). In Islam, men who take a woman’s virginity are required by law to marry them.
Some betrothed couples used pregnancy to obtain parental consent (Duby and Perrot, eds.
1994).
Men will equate the marginal cost of transfers C 0(T ) to the marginal cost of manip-
ulation C 0(wfa). A social planner can raise the marginal cost of ex ante manipulation,
C 0(wfa), but male-centric societies that only consider male welfare will tend to lower the
marginal cost of ex ante manipulation, hence the phenomenon of “blaming the victim”,
again common around the world. Brazilian police often subject domestic violence victims
to abusive treatment aimed at implicating her in the crime (Rubinger, et.al). In Japan, vic-
tims of rape are typically blamed (French 2003). This happens in China and Pakistan too:
abandonment of rape victims for the “shame they inflict” on relatives (Kahn and Yardley
2004) and the expectation that they commit suicide (Kristof 2004). Women are told if you
su↵er molestation or groping, you should be ashamed. Talking about it to anyone taints
you for the rest of your life. Recently a member of the Japanese Parliament said boys who
commit group rape are in good shape and that they are rather normal. (French 2003)
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Ex ante manipulation may entail negative externalities, which leads to the third obser-
vation:
Proposition 3 : Equalizing virginity premiums, prenuptial agreements, and alimony rights
– any mechanism that reduces the asymmetry – reduce the incentive for men to manipulate
women’s ex ante market wages.
Lowering female virginity premiums (by raising wfp) or raising male virginity premiums
(lowering wmp) raise w
indiff
f ⌘ [J   wmp + wfp]/2. The higher is w
indiff
f , males have less
incentive to reduce wfa. In the case of equal virginity premiums, Jmax = Jmin, there is no
range of J where asymmetric gains from joint production incentivize ex ante manipulation.
Intuitively, both men and women become specified to the marriage. Equalizing virginity
premiums completes the incomplete marriage contract.
Now suppose the marriage production J is uncertain and the surplus, S ⌘ J wmp wfp,
can be revealed to be negative in marriage. Studies of abused women in the US have shown
that the majority do not experience physical violence until after they marry. After they
marry, the frequency and severity of violence tends to escalate (Heise, et.al 1994).
Proposition 4 : Asymmetry increases the incidence of abusive marriages. There exists a
range of marriages with negative surpluses S, which would have e ciently separated under
complete contracts but do not separate under asymmetric virginity premiums.
Under complete contracts, where there are no virginity premiums and everyone has
the same ex ante and ex post market wages, if the realized marriage surplus is negative,
J < Jmin, then marriage does not guarantee agents’ outside opportunities, marriages will
e ciently separate.
Under asymmetric virginity premiums, women are less inclined to separate. But men
are also less inclined to separate. Women still need to be su ciently compensated for their
appropriation. Men’s ex post market wages may be lowered until their threat point is
su ciently low. Recall that females receive S/2+wfp and males receive S/2+wmp, where
S + wmp + wfp = J : as wmp falls, females receive a larger share [J   wmp + wfp]/2. To
su ciently compensate the woman, wmp falls to w0mp such that T+[J w0mp+wfp]/2 wfa =
0, in other words, w0mp = J   2(wfa   T ) +wfp. As the female premium rises, wfp falls or
wfa increases, w0mp falls as well.
Hence, not only is the woman’s incentive to separate an ine cient marriage lower, but
the man’s incentive to separate is also lower. Marriages that should separate may not
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under asymmetric virginity premiums. Studies of divorced or widowed men suggest partial
appropriation of the man to marriage (Waite). More formally, to show there exists a range
of negative surplus marriages which do not separate under asymmetric virginity premiums:
holding fixed what women receive in marriage3, the lower are women’s outside options wfp,
the less likely they choose to separate. Women receive S/2 + wfp inside marriage and if
S < 0, then clearly women separate and receive wfp outside. But if what women receive
outside marriage falls (w/fp < wfp), then marriages only separate when S < 2[w
0
fp   wfp].
In the extreme case, women are killed attempting to file for divorce, as happened recently
in Pakistan (Lakhani 2004). Similarly, depressing male’s outside options lead to marriages
only separating when S < 2[w0mp   wmp].
Asymmetric virginity premiums lead to welfare losses and social ine ciencies as factors
in joint production do not separate even as their joint surplus becomes negative. Equalizing
virginity premiums can be Pareto improving.
3.1 Summary
To summarize, the model has the following empirical predictions.
• Asymmetric virginity premiums increase the incentive for men to lower women’s ex
ante market wages (non-domestic assault).
• Asymmetry increases the incidence of abusive marriages (domestic assault).
4 Asymmetric Virginity Premiums in China and the US
4.1 Data
The empirical analysis draws from the Chinese Health and Family Life Survey (CHFLS)
and the (US) National Health and Social Life Survey (NHSLS). CHFLS is a nationally
representative survey conducted between 1999 and 2000 of the adult population in China,
ages 20 to 64, with the exception of Tibet and Hong Kong. Interviewers were the same
gender as the respondent. For the sake of privacy, interviews took place away from the
respondent’s home. Portions of the interview were completely computerized to maximize
privacy. The sample size is 3,821. The NHSLS is a nationally representative survey of
3
If what women receive in marriage is not fixed, the lower are women’s outside options wfp, the lower
is her share [J   wmp + wfp]/2 of the surplus, which suggests a direct relationship with domestic abuse.
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the US adult population in 1992 with a sample size of 3,432. Portions of the interview
were answered and submitted in a privacy envelope away from the interviewer to maximize
privacy.
In CHFLS, the measure of virginity premiums refers to the question, “Nowadays in
our society, some couples have sex when they are dating, and they eventually get married.
Is this a moral issue? What is your opinion? Definitely not (1)/mostly not/perhaps
yes/definitely yes (4)” The question is coded as 1/2/3/4, with higher values indicating
increasing moral value placed on virginity. To check whether this question proxies for
traditionalism, I compare responses to the question, “Some say that a wife should be
responsible for the family and domestic tasks while a husband should focus on career and
matters outside the household. Do you agree?” The question is also coded as 1/2/3/4.
The comparison highlights a premium placed on virginity not just traditional gender roles
in general.
In NHSLS, the measure of virginity premiums refers to the question, “There’s been
a lot of discussion about the way morals and attitudes about sex are changing in this
country. If a man and a woman have sex relations before marriage, do you think it is
always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?” The
question is coded as 1/2/3/4, with higher values indicating increasing moral value placed
on virginity. There are no questions regarding traditional gender roles so as comparison, I
consider the question, “What if they are in their teens, say 14-16 years old? In that case, do
you think sex relations before marriage are always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only
sometimes, or not wrong at all?” The question is also coded as 1/2/3/4. This comparison
highlights a particular premium placed on virginity as opposed to teenage sexual activity.
The analysis assumes respondents answer the morality of premarital sex question as
referring more strongly to the behavior of themselves as opposed to others. Whether this
is true relies on two thought experiments. One is to ask, do or did you prefer yourself/your
spouse to be virgin at time of marriage, and examine whether the di↵erence-in-di↵erences
in male and female responses correspond to the original question. Alternatively, one can
imagine a second-price auction where bidders are randomly assigned information on vir-
ginity of potential marriage partners. The question is whether virginity as moral issue is
more positively related to a male bidder’s valuation of virginity and more positively related
to a female biddee’s valuation of virginity than they are to a female bidder’s valuation and
male biddee’s valuation.
The female measure of gender violence refers to the question, “This section relates to
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what you have done sexually with a man since you reached puberty (that is since you
were about 13 years old). Have you ever been forced by a man to do something that you
did not want to do?” The question is coded as 1/0. I show both linear probability and
probit marginal e↵ects specifications. Using self-reported forced sex addresses some of the
concerns of human rights activists that pain may be culturally specific and social scientists
ought not to define what is “forced” for others. A social planner would also optimize
self-reported utility.
The male measure of gender violence refers to the question, “This section relates to
what you have done sexually with a woman since you reached puberty (that is since you
were about 13 years old). Have you ever forced a woman to do something that she did not
want to do?” The question is coded as 1/0. I also examine the question, “Have you ever
paid a woman to have sex?”
4.2 China
Table 1 reports evidence of asymmetric virginity premiums in China. OLS estimates indi-
cate females have higher virginity premiums than males, and this relationship is robust to
controls:
Pij =  Fij + ↵
0Xij +  j + "ij
where Pij represents the virginity premium for individual i at interview site j, Fij is a
dummy for whether the individual is female, Xij represents demographic control variables,
age, education, urban, working, income, living at home, and household size, and  j repre-
sents interview site fixed e↵ects.
The estimates indicate a strong association between the female dummy and virginity
premiums that is very robust to control variables. The estimates 0.255 and 0.251 between
Columns 1 and 2 are remarkably similar. Examining actual premarital sex behavior indi-
cates a similar pattern in Columns 3 and 4. Females are less likely to have premarital sex.
To test for the possibility the measure of virginity premium merely captures traditional
views on gender roles, I repeat the regression with a proxy for traditionalism in Columns
5 and 6. Interestingly, females are no more likely to report valuing traditional gender roles
than are males, suggesting there is something particular about virginity as opposed to
general traditional values that females are concerned about.
Asymmetric virginity premiums (AVP) also vary systematically along certain demo-
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graphic characteristics. Table 2 shows how the asymmetry disappears with education. It
reports OLS estimates of an interaction model relating virginity premiums and a female
dummy interacted with demographic controls:
Pij =  0Fij +  
0
1XijFij + ↵
0Xij +  j + "ij
Columns 1 and 2 indicate the asymmetry disappears with education (which varies from 1
to 6), which may explain why some places worry education corrupts a young lady’s morals
(Kristof 2004, Schle↵er 2004) and why education may not be a panacea if girls’ schools
are burned (Constable 2003). Columns 3 and 4 indicate education does not play a role in
reducing the asymmetry in actual premarital sex behavior. Columns 5 and 6 suggest that
at low education levels, females value traditional gender roles more than do males but at
high education levels, males value traditional gender roles more than do females.
4.3 US
Asymmetric virginity premiums appear to persist over economic development. Table 3
reports OLS estimates of the analog of Table 1:
Pij =  Fij + ↵
0Xij +  j + "ij
where Pij represents the virginity premium for individual i in region j, Fij is a dummy
for whether the individual is female, Xij represents demographic control variables, age,
education, urban, income, white, immigrant, household size, and raised with religion, and
 j is region fixed e↵ects.
The estimates again show a strong association between females and virginity premiums
that is robust to demographic controls. The estimates 0.272 and 0.203 in Columns 1 and
2 are very similar. Perhaps interestingly, these estimates are also similar to the female
gradient in China, 0.251 in Table 1 Column 1. Examining actual premarital sex behavior
indicates a similar robustness in Columns 3 and 4. Females are again less likely to have
premarital sex. Columns 5 and 6 repeat the regression with the views on teenage sex.
Females are again more concerned about teenage sex than are males. In the US, asymmetric
virginity premiums do not decrease with education; the analog of Table 2 is not displayed.
Why asymmetric virginity premiums disappear with education in China but not the
U.S. may be related to the role of religion in the U.S., where there tends to be a posi-
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tive correlation between religious attendance and years of education. In former socialist
countries there is a negative relationship between years of education and belief in God,
whereas in many developed countries, including the U.S., there were strong positive cor-
relations between years of education and belief in God (Glaeser and Sacerdote 2008). If
religious beliefs are a driver of asymmetric virginity premiums, this di↵erence between the
two countries would imply that the asymmetry can persist with education.
4.4 Individualized Asymmetric Virginity Premiums
Appendix Table B shows average female and male virginity premiums for the US East (New
England and Mid-Atlantic), US West (Pacific), US South (East South Central, West South
Central, and South Atlantic), and US Midwest (East North Central, West North Central,
and Mountain) and their asymmetry. The second column indicates virginity premiums are
highest in the US South and lowest in the US East. The asymmetry is also highest in the
US South. The relationship between female virginity premiums and asymmetric virginity
premiums is not mechanical: it could have been the case that as female premiums rise,
male premiums rise even faster so that the asymmetry shrinks as female premiums rise.
Formally, to get an individualized asymmetric virginity premium, consider the thought
experiment of computing an individual’s virginity premium were his or her gender switched.
The intuition is to match each individual to the closest individual of the opposite gender
based on observables and examine the di↵erence in virginity premiums. I first estimate the
interacted model:
Pij =  0Fij +  
0
1XijFij + ↵
0Xij +  j + "ij
I then compute for each female and each male:
AV Pij = b 0 + b 10Xij
which is a proxy for the individualized asymmetric virginity premium. Appendix Table B
displays the estimates as if Xij were regional fixed e↵ects.
Theory suggests asymmetric virginity premiums (wfa   wfp)   (wma   wmp) to be
positively correlated with female virginity premiums, (wfa   wfp), but not male virginity
premiums, (wma   wmp). In fact, as (wma   wmp) ! 0, then the asymmetric virginity
premium may not be correlated with male virginity premiums at all.
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Table 4 estimates the OLS regression for females and for males:
Pij =  AV Pij + wij
relating the asymmetric virginity premium with gender-specific virginity premiums.
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 4 indicate female virginity premiums and asymmetric vir-
ginity premiums are strongly positively correlated in both China and the US. Columns 3
and 4 indicate male virginity premiums are not related to asymmetries in China and are
negatively related to the asymmetries in the US. This suggests examining the impact of
female virginity premiums may be similar to examining the impact of asymmetric virginity
premiums.
5 Estimating the Impact of Virginity Premiums on Gender
Violence
The theory suggests the following structural relationship:
Vij =  Pij + ↵
0Xij +  j + "ij (1)
where Vij represents gender violence for individual i in region j, Pij represents the virginity
premium for individual i in region j, Xij represents demographic control variables, age,
education, urban, income, white, immigrant, household size, and raised with religion, and
 j is region fixed e↵ects. The OLS relationship between virginity premiums and forced sex
may be biased downwards (Table 7 Column 1) if virginity premiums are associated with
views that consider forced sex to be shameful: “Women are told if you su↵er molestation
or groping, you should be ashamed. Talking about it to anyone taints you for the rest of
your life.” (French 2003)
I exploit variation in conservatism of religious upbringing to identify the e↵ect of vir-
ginity premiums, the idea being that the more conservative the religious upbringing, the
greater the female virginity premium. The first stage regression is:
Pij = ⇡0Zij + ⇡
0
1Xij + gj + ⌘ij (2)
where Zij represents the instrument, conservativeness of religious upbringing. I consider
two alternative measures of religious conservativeness. One is whether the religious up-
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bringing is evangelical or not. Evangelical is defined as the Protestant denominations of
Baptist, Seventh Day Adventists, Pentecostal, Amish, Church of God, Churches of Christ,
and other, where other is not the mainline denominations of Lutheran, Methodist, Presby-
terian, Episcopalian, Quaker and Disciplines of Christ (Evans 2004). The second measure
is an index from 0 to 1, where 1 is the fraction of charitable giving contributed to religion,
the idea being that religious intensity is a function of the degree of participation in social
insurance (Chen 2004a). The actual values are Mormons (0.91), Evangelical Protestant
(0.82), Mainline Protestant (0.62), Catholic (0.51), Other (0.50), Jewish (0.40), and None
(0.40) taken from the Center on Philanthropy Panel Study (Evans 2004).
The corresponding reduced form regression is:
Vij =  Zij + ↵
0Xij +  j + "ij (3)
I then conduct two control experiments for traditionalism, using parental education and
immigrant status to check if unobservables correlated with both religiously conservative
backgrounds and with parental education increase gender violence or if unobservables cor-
related with both religiously conservative backgrounds and immigrant backgrounds increase
gender violence.
5.1 First Stage: Religious Background and Virginity Premiums
Table 5 documents the relationship between religious background and female virginity pre-
miums using the specification in equation 2. Column 1 indicates women raised in evangeli-
cal or religiously conservative backgrounds report higher virginity premiums. Interestingly,
Column 2 indicates women raised in evangelical and religious conservative backgrounds are
no more likely to think of teenage sex as a moral issue, suggesting there is something par-
ticular about the morality of virginity as opposed to teenage sex more generally that is
a concern of evangelicals and religious conservatives. Also, perhaps interestingly, women
raised in evangelical backgrounds are no less likely to have premarital sex, as indicated
in Column 3. Women raised in religious conservative backgrounds are less likely to have
premarital sex (this di↵erence is driven by Mormons: 69% of women raised in Mormon
households did not have premarital sex but for evangelical backgrounds and the population
more generally, 20% of women did not have premarital sex). Column 4 tests whether vir-
ginity premiums proxy for prudishness. However, women raised in religiously conservative
backgrounds are somewhat more likely to think about sex.
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5.2 Reduced Form Evidence
Do women with higher virginity premiums su↵er more gender violence? To test this, I
estimate equation 3. Panel A in Table 6 indicates women raised in evangelical backgrounds
are 6% more likely to have forced sex. Column 1 displays the linear probability model and
Column 2 displays the marginal e↵ects from a probit model. Panel B corroborates that
women raised in religiously conservative backgrounds are again more likely to have forced
sex.
5.3 Control Experiments
In examining the causal impact of female virginity premiums on gender violence, an impor-
tant threat to identification is whether conservativeness of religious upbringing is correlated
with omitted factors that increase gender violence. The data allows conducting two control
experiments for traditionalism, using parental education and immigrant status to check if
unobservables correlated with both religiously conservative backgrounds and with parental
education increase gender violence or if unobservables correlated with both religiously con-
servative backgrounds and immigrant backgrounds increase gender violence.
The pattern of female virginity premiums is much less pronounced for parental ed-
ucation and immigrants. I estimate equation 2 for parental education in Panel C and
immigrant status in Panel D of Table 5. Parental education is not related to female vir-
ginity premiums. Immigrant women have higher but not statistically significantly higher
virginity premiums. Panel C of Table 6 displays the reduced form relationship, specified
in equation 3. Again, the contrast is apparent. Parental education is unrelated to forced
sex. Immigrant women have less but not statistically significantly less forced sex.
5.4 2SLS Estimates
Table 7 estimates equation 1 for linear and probit specifications. Columns 2 and 3 suggest
when a woman who moves from one level of virginity premium to the next, she is 25% to
34% more likely to su↵er forced sex. Column 1 presents OLS and probit marginal e↵ects
estimates of equation 1. The OLS relationship between virginity premiums and forced sex
may be biased downwards if virginity premiums are associated with views that consider
forced sex to be shameful: “Women are told if you su↵er molestation or groping, you should
be ashamed. Talking about it to anyone taints you for the rest of your life.” (French 2003)
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5.5 Male Responses
The OLS relationship between virginity premiums and forced sex may be biased downwards
for women if shame is associated with abuse and this shame is greater for women with higher
virginity premiums. But the OLS relationship for males might not be biased downwards.
Table 8 estimates the OLS regression for males:
Vij =  AV Pij + wij
where AV Pij is computed as in section 4.4 and Vij refers to male reports of forcing women
to do something sexual that she did not want to do and whether they have ever paid a
woman to have sex.
Column 1 indicates the asymmetry is positively correlated with forcing women and
Column 2 indicates the asymmetry is positively correlated with paying women.
6 Conclusion
This paper builds and tests a model of marriage as an incomplete contract that arises from
asymmetric virginity premiums, the inequality between men and women’s ex ante and ex
post marriage market opportunities. The model has the predictions men may seek to lower
women’s ex ante “market wages” in order to induce entry into joint production. Ine cient
or abusive marriages are less likely to separate.
I find suggestive evidence asymmetric virginity premiums persist over economic devel-
opment and that they may be reduced by education but not always. The asymmetry is
highly correlated with female but not male virginity premiums. Women raised in con-
servative religious backgrounds have higher virginity premiums and more forced sex but
this is not due to parental education or immigrant traditionalism. Asymmetric virginity
premiums are positively correlated with men forcing sex on women and paying women for
sex.
To the extent governments, international organizations, and NGOs are concerned about
gender violence, the results suggest lowering female or raising male virginity premiums
would be Pareto improving. Subsidizing prices that women pay doctors to appear virgin
before marriage, or informing women that they are commonly available, would in equilib-
rium reduce the asymmetric virginity premium, but would it reduce 80% of gender violence
(Kandela 1996)? The US has the highest incidence of rape in the western industrial world,
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which may be related to it also having the highest virginity premiums: 2.4 million people in
the US have signed “virginity pledges” since 1993 (Bearman and Bruckner 2001); are these
pledges, and sex-education more generally, alleviating or exacerbating the asymmetry?
Social commentators and casual observation suggests inverse premiums exist among
some age groups and regions in the Western world today (Denizet-Lewis 2004). The model’s
predictions would be reversed in this case (wfp   wfa > wmp   wma, typically, when
wfp > wfa): women have the incentive to fete and lower men’s ex ante market wages.
Same-sex vs. mixed-sex marriages can also be examined by this model. To the extent
same-sex marriages lack asymmetric virginity premiums, they would be more e cient than
mixed-sex marriages.
Constructing policy interventions to reduce asymmetric virginity premiums is limited
only by the imagination. Traditional Islam in central Java prohibits men from wearing
wedding rings but require women to do so. This clearly exacerbates the asymmetry of
market opportunities even within marriage. Could randomly distributing wedding rings
induce a separating equilibrium where men of di↵erent types choose whether or not to wear
the wedding ring, and women observe this, which in equilibrium reduces gender violence
and sexually transmitted diseases?
Certain beliefs may be a channel through which gender violence arises, indicating that
in the mechanism design of optimal beliefs, gender di↵erences between ex ante and ex post
marriage market opportunities should be reduced. When one considers that in many soci-
eties female rape victims are blamed or outcasted by their own families, female mutilation,
forced marriages, stoning, and witch trials from Salem to Kenya, it is easy to consider
band-aid solutions that fall o↵ without understanding the underlying cause of the phenom-
ena. This paper shows how asymmetric virginity premiums may drive many of the visible
manifestations of female appropriability across time and space, suggesting that in terms of
policy, changing these asymmetries may mitigate a plethora of rights violations.
7 Data Appendix
The empirical analysis draws from two sources, the Chinese Health and Family Life Survey
(CHFLS) and the National Health and Social Life Survey (NHSLS), both collected by the
NORC. CHFLS is a nationally representative survey conducted between 1999 and 2000
of the adult population in China, ages 20 to 64, with the exception of Tibet and Hong
Kong. Interviewers were the same gender as the respondent. For the sake of privacy,
20
interviews took place away from the respondent’s home. Portions of the interview were
completely computerized to maximize privacy. The sample size is 3,821. The NHSLS is a
nationally representative survey of the US adult population in 1992 with a sample size of
3,432. Portions of the interview were answered and submitted in a privacy envelope away
from the interviewer to maximize privacy.
The female measure of gender violence refers to the question, “This section relates to
what you have done sexually with a man since you reached puberty (that is since you were
about 13 years old). Have you ever been forced by a man to do something that you did
not want to do?” The question is coded as 1/0. I show both linear probability and
probit marginal e↵ects specifications. Using self-reported forced sex addresses some of the
concerns of human rights activists that pain may be culturally specific and social scientists
ought not to define what is “forced” for others. A social planner would also optimize
self-reported utility.
The male measure of gender violence refers to the question, “This section relates to
what you have done sexually with a woman since you reached puberty (that is since you
were about 13 years old). Have you ever forced a woman to do something that she did not
want to do?” The question is coded as 1/0. I also examine the question, “Have you ever
paid a woman to have sex?”
In CHFLS, the measure of virginity premiums refers to the question, “Nowadays in our
society, some couples have sex when they are dating, and they eventually get married. Is
this a moral issue? What is your opinion?” The question is coded as 1/2/3/4, with higher
values indicating increasing moral value placed on virginity. As a comparison question,
I also proxy for traditionalism with, “Some say that a wife should be responsible for the
family and domestic tasks while a husband should focus on career and matters outside the
household. Do you agree?” The question is also coded as 1/2/3/4. The comparison
highlights a premium placed on virginity not just traditional gender roles in general.
In NHSLS, the measure of virginity premiums refers to the question, “There’s been a
lot of discussion about the way morals and attitudes about sex are changing in this country.
If a man and a woman have sex relations before marriage, do you think it is always wrong,
almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?” The question is coded
as 1/2/3/4, with higher values indicating increasing moral value placed on virginity. As
comparison question, I consider the question, “What if they are in their teens, say 14-16
years old? In that case, do you think sex relations before marriage are always wrong,
almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?” The question is also
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coded as 1/2/3/4. This comparison highlights a particular premium placed on virginity
as opposed to teenage sexual activity.
I consider two alternative measures of religious conservativeness of upbringing. One
is whether the religious upbringing is evangelical or not. Evangelical is defined as the
Protestant denominations of Baptist, Seventh Day Adventists, Pentecostal, Amish, Church
of God, Churches of Christ, Pentecostals, and other, where other is not the mainline
denominations of Lutheran, Methodist, Presbyterian, Episcopalian, Quaker and Disciplines
of Christ (Evans 2004). The second measure is an index from 0 to 1, where 1 is the
fraction of charitable giving contributed to religion. The actual values are Mormons
(0.91), Evangelical Protestant (0.82), Mainline Protestant (0.62), Catholic (0.51), Other
(0.50), Jewish (0.40), and None (0.40) taken from the Center on Philanthropy Panel Study
(Evans 2004).
Demographic control variables in CHFLS are age, education, urban, working, income,
living at home, household size, and interview site fixed e↵ects. Education ranges from 1
(never attended school) through 6 (attended university or graduate school). Urban is a
dummy for whether the individual lived in a rural village or rural town at the age of 14.
Working is a dummy for whether the individual currently has a full-time job or is working
on a farm. Income is the monthly personal income for the past 12 months. Living at
home is a dummy for whether the individual is living at a parent’s or child’s or in-law’s or
own home. There are 70 interview sites reflecting the sampling method.
Demographic control variables in NHSLS are age, education, urban, income, white,
immigrant, household size, raised with religion, and region fixed e↵ects. Education ranges
from 1 (8th grade or less is the highest schooling completed) to 8 (advanced degree). The
placebo instrument, parental education, is the average education of the mother and father.
Urban is a dummy for current residence. White, immigrant, and raised with religion are
dummy variables. There are 9 regions: New England, Mid-Atlantic, South Atlantic, East
South Central, West South Central, East North Central, West North Central, Mountain,
and Pacific.
I use the entire sample of 3,821 households for the China portion of the analysis and
the entire sample of 3,432 households for the US portion of the analysis. Appendix Table
A presents some descriptive statistics.
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